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Matt Schlensker & Justin Fisher*
This year, the Oklahoma courts answered who is liable for royalty
payments under the PRSA, how a tenant may prove ouster of a cotenant in
an adverse possession proceeding, how to sever a joint tenancy involving
more than two parties, and how can a court analyze a will which includes a
complete restraint on alienation.
* Matt is a Member at Steptoe and Johnson PLLC, where he focuses his practice on
title examination, including drilling opinions and division order title opinions. He also advises
clients regarding acquisitions, operating issues, and curative efforts. Matt earned his JD from
South Texas College of Law Houston. He is licensed in Oklahoma and Texas, and he is Board
Certified in Oil, Gas, and Mineral Law by the Texas Board of Legal Specialization. Justin
Fisher is a member in the Charleston, West Virginia office of Steptoe & Johnson PPLC.
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In the federal courts, the Eastern District of Oklahoma and the Tenth
Circuit certified class actions related to underpayment of royalties and the
breach of the implied duty of marketability, while the Tenth Circuit also
discussed the elements of trespass relate to an expired right-of-way on Native
American lands.
I. State Cases
A. TexasFile, LLC v Boevers, 2019 OK CIV APP 20, 437 P.3d 2111
TexasFile involved whether or not the Oklahoma Open Records Act
allows a county clerk to provide electronic access to county land records.
TexasFile provides its customers with access to county land records via
the internet. In May of 2016, TexasFile requested a “complete electronic
copy of all the Kingfisher County land records that are currently available in
electronic format” pursuant to the Oklahoma Open Records Act, specifically
all records available on the Oklahoma County Records website.2 TexasFile
did not request the tract indices. The Kingfisher County clerk did not respond
to this request.
In January of 2017, TexasFile made a second request, and acknowledged
Oklahoma, Blaine, and Logan counties had recently complied with such
requests.3
In May of 2017, Jeannie Boevers, Kingfisher County Clerk, denied the
request, explaining the request:
does not fall within the provisions of the Act as interpreted by the
Oklahoma Supreme County in County Records, Inc. v
Armstrong.[4] Neither the tract index nor the date (land records)
inextricably linked to the computer software can be provided for
resale. Commercial use or dissemination of these records if
prohibited. You are welcome to come to my office like all other
persons to inspect and copy documents.5
In response, TexasFile filed a declaratory judgment and mandamus action
against Boevers asking the trial court to determine it was entitled to an
electronic copy of the Kingfisher County land records maintained by the
county clerk. In response, Boevers and Lori Fulks, the Garvin County Clerk
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

TexasFile, LLC v. Boevers, 2019 OK CIV APP 20, 437 P.3d 211.
Id. ¶ 3.
Id. ¶ 4.
2012 OK 60, 299 P.3d 865.
Id. ¶ 5.
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(the “County Clerks”), sought a uniform judicial determination of whether
the Open Records Act requires the County Clerks to hand over their
electronic files so TexasFile may resell those records.6
In October of 2017, TexasFile filed a motion for summary judgment
arguing Boevers had a statutory duty to maintain land records and provide
electronic copies of those records upon request. TexasFile argued section
386, title 19 requires Boevers make the public land records available for
viewing and copying. TexasFile conceded the Open Records Act prohibits
the copying of the tract index for resale, but the index was not part of the
request.7
In February of 2018, the trial court denied TexasFile’s summary judgment
and granted summary judgment for the County Clerks. The Court of Civil
Appeals affirmed.
The court cited the Oklahoma Supreme Court’s decision in County
Records, Inc. v Armstrong which pointed out “access to instruments of record
shall be for immediate and lawful abstracting purposes only. The sale of the
instruments of record for profit to the public either on the internet or any
other such forum by any company holding a permit to build an abstract plant
is prohibited.”8 The legislature intended production of the tract index and
land records would not be limited unless the request is for the sale of that
information. Therefore, the Open Records Act “prohibits a county clerk form
providing any documents and data from the land records for the intentional
sale of that information.”9
Based on the Oklahoma Supreme Court’s decision in County Records, Inc.
v Armstrong, the Court of Civil Appeals ruled the trial court did not err in
denying TexasFile’s request for the land records.
B. Hodge v Wright, 2019 OK CIV APP 1010
Hodge discussed the elements of adverse possession in Oklahoma and
how a cotenant can show ouster of another cotenant. The Court of Civil
Appeals reversed the trial court’s ruling, finding Hodge had shown an ouster
of her cotenants and proven title by adverse possession.
In her 2014 petition, Yvonne Hodge sought to quiet title to a quarter
section in Noble County, asserting she owned the property individually and
6. Id. ¶ 7.
7. Id. ¶ 8-10.
8. Id. ¶ 20 (quoting 2012 OK 60, 299 P.3d 865 (citing OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.1, §§ 227.10
through 227.30 (2019))).
9. Id.
10. Hodge v. Wright, 2019 OK CIV APP 10, 435 P.3d 126.
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as the personal representative of the estate of her husband, Leroy Hodge.11
According to Hodge, Mary Roney owned the property upon her death in
1935, and Mary’s son, Charles Roney, possessed the land until he died in
1980. When Mary Roney’s estate was probated in 1956, her heirs were
unknown except for Charles, and starting in 1971, Glen Hodge, Yvonne’s
father-in-law, leased the land from Charles Roney. After Charles died in
1980, his estate was distributed to his wife, and when she died, her estate was
distributed to her two brothers, Ruben Reimer and Sylvester Reimer, in 1982.
Hodge alleged Sylvester Reimer died in 1982 and his estate was never
probated in Oklahoma. From 1980 to 1993, Glen Hodge and his son, Leroy,
leased the property from the Charles Roney Estate, his heirs, or the estates of
his heirs.12
Also, Hodge alleged Ruben Reimer’s share was distributed to his children
in 1993 and Leroy Hodge then bought their interests. Therefore, as of 1993,
Hodge owned an undivided 1/8 interest in the property. Hodge claimed she
and her husband Leroy have occupied the property without paying rent to
another party since 1993, and they have paid taxes, built fences and ponds,
and cleared trees, resulting in Hodge acquiring full title to the property by
adverse possession.13
Hodge alleged the unknown heirs of Sylvester Reimer were one group of
defendants, who owned a 1/8 surface interest, and the heirs of the seven half
siblings of Charles Roney were the remaining defendants. Hodge asserted
Charles Roney held the property adversely to the interests of the half siblings
from 1935 (Mary Roney’s death) to 1980 (Charles Roney’s death).14
In an amended petition, Hodge named all potential heirs of Mary Roney’s
children as defendants, and alleged she satisfied the requirements for adverse
possession for more than fifteen years.15
Two of the defendants, Sally Stewart and Christy Allyce Lane, requested
time to assert an interest in the property. Stewart counterclaimed and asked
the court to determine her interest in the property and quiet that interest to
her.16
The trial court entered default judgment in favor of Hodge against 20
defendants who had failed to answer, as well as several other defendants.
However, the trial court denied Hodge’s motion for summary judgment
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

Id. ¶ 2.
Id.
Id. ¶ 3.
Id.
Id. ¶ 4.
Id. ¶ 5.
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against Stewart. The trial court also denied Stewart’s counterclaim for quiet
title because she did not present any evidence establishing an interest in the
property, but the court denied Hodge showed she was entitled to the property
by adverse possession because she was a cotenant, and therefore she must
prove an ouster of the other cotenants in the property.17 The trial court ruled
Hodge must go through a partition proceeding. The Court of Civil Appeals
reversed the trial court’s finding and ruled Hodge had proven title through
adverse possession.
The Court of Civil Appeals set out the elements of adverse possession: “to
establish adverse possession, the claimant must show that possession was
hostile, under a claim of right or color of title, actual, open, notorious,
exclusive, and continuous for the statutory period of fifteen years.”18
The appellate court noted it was undisputed that Hodge met these
elements. The trial court only denied Hodge’s claim because it ruled the case
must be analyzed as between cotenants, where the general rule is “the tenant
in possession is deemed to be holding said possession for himself and for the
tenant who is not in possession. The possession of the one is constructively
possession for the other. Thus it is that the mere holding of possession, by
one tenant, can never be considered adverse to his cotenant until there is some
act or conduct on his part which must give the other cotenant notice that his
title has bene repudiated or is disputed by the one in possession, or there must
be such conduct by the tenant in possession as reasonably would put the other
tenant on inquiry.”19
Oklahoma caselaw states more than mere possession is required, but the
caselaw is unclear as to what acts are sufficient to prove ouster of a cotenant.
In Westheimer v Neustadt, the court held that collecting rents, paying taxes,
and representing to the lessee that he owned the property was insufficient to
operate as an ouster.20
However, in Wirick v Nance, the Oklahoma Supreme Court held a
cotenant proved title by adverse possession by showing possession was open,
visible, continuous and exclusive to the point that his title was not in
subordination to any other claimants of title.21 This case suggested a party
could prove ouster of a cotenant with the same evidence one might use to
prove adverse possession against a stranger. The appellate court cited two

17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Id. ¶ 6-7.
Id. ¶ 8 (citing Akin v. Castleberry, 2012 OK 79, ¶11, 286 P.3d 638).
Preston v. Preston, 1949 OK 59, ¶20, 207 P.2d 313.
Westheimer v. Neustadt, 1961 OK 121, 362 P.2d 110, 111.
Wirick v. Nance, 1936 OK 98, 62 P.2d 997.
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additional cases in support of the idea that a cotenant could prove ouster with
similar facts to Hodge’s.22
The appellate court noted no one ever attempted to assert any claim to the
property until Hodge filed her quiet title action, and even then, no one
presented any contrary evidence. Also, the court pointed out a partition
proceeding would be futile because there was no indication that there is
anybody else with whom to partition the property. “The purpose of a quiet
title action is to determine who is the real owner of property and put to rest
adverse claims.”23
The trial court did not determine the real owner of the property, and the
appellate court ruled this was an error. Based on the undisputed evidence,
Hodge proved she owned the property by adverse possession, so the Court of
Civil Appeals remanded to the lower court with directions to quiet title to the
property in Hodge’s name.
C. Goodson v McCrory, 2018 OK CIV APP 59, 426 P.3d 636.24
Goodson detailed the requirements for establishing a joint tenancy in title,
and how one party can sever a joint tenancy.
In 2001, Kaci Susanne Goodson, Patricia Lynn Farquhar, Mary Beth
Guzman, and Sherry Doris McCrory were granted property in Tulsa County
“in equal shares in their individual capacities, as joint tenants, and not as
tenants in common, on the death of” the grantor. In 2011, the grantor passed
away.25
Goodson filed the petition in this case in 2017 for quiet title, declaratory
relief, and/or a determination of her rights in the property. Goodson contested
the validity of a 2002 deed wherein Goodson, Farquhar, and Guzman
purportedly conveyed their interest in the property to McCrory. Goodson
contested the validity of the 2002 deed as to her interest only and not the
interests of Farquhar or Guzman.26
Goodson then filed a motion for summary judgment claiming she did not
sign the 2002 deed. Her typed name and written signature on the deed were
misspelled (Goodman instead of Goodson), and McCrory agreed it was not
Goodson’s signature on the 2002 deed. Goodson requested an order be

22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Preston & Beaver v. Wilson, 1926 OK 267, 245 P. 34, 117 Okl. 68.
Hodge, 2019 OK CIV APP ¶12.
Goodson v. McCrory, 2018 OK CIV APP 59, 426 P.3d 636.
Id. ¶1.
Id. ¶2.
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entered determining McCrory and Goodson own the property as joint
tenants.27
McCrory did not respond to Goodson’s motion for summary judgment.
Therefore, the trial court ruled the property vested in Goodson and McCrory
as joint tenants with the right of survivorship.28 McCrory then filed a motion
for new trial contesting the trial court’s legal conclusion, although without
disputing the underlying facts. McCrory argued she should own 75% of the
property and Goodson should own the remaining 25% of the property as
tenants in common.29 The Court of Civil Appeals reversed and remanded the
case, disagreeing with both parties.
Fist, the court cited the Oklahoma Supreme Court to explain how a joint
tenancy is created: “A joint tenancy is created only when unities of time, title,
interest, and possession are present…alteration of any required unity will
destroy the joint tenancy.”30 Therefore, McCrory argued the 2002 deed
destroyed the joint tenancy created by the 2001 deed.31
In fact, the McGinnis court explained “if A and B hold as joint tenants and
B, with or without the permission of A, conveys to C, the joint tenancy is
destroyed because unity of interest is eliminated; the result is A and C hold
as tenants in common,” one-half each.32
However, only two of the four joint tenants conveyed their interests in the
2002 deed. When at least two joint tenants do not convey their interests, “a
conveyance by other joint tenants does not destroy the continuance of the
joint tenancy among the remaining joint tenants, though it does destroy the
joint tenancy as to the conveyed interests.”33
“If A, B and C are joint tenants and C conveys to D, A and B continue as
joint tenants in an undivided two-thirds of the whole estate and D has” the
remaining one-third as a tenant in common with A and B.34
Therefore, the appellate court explained the 2002 deed severed the joint
tenancy as to the shares of Farquhar and Guzman and transferred their
interests to McCrory outright. This made McCrory a tenant in common as to
an undivided 1/2 interest in the property, being the interest acquired from
27.
28.
29.
30.
1198.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Id. ¶3.
Id. ¶4.
Id. ¶ 5.
See Am. Nat. Bank & Tr. Co. of Shawnee v. McGinnis, 1977 OK 47, ¶3, 571 P.2d
Goodson, 2018 OK CIV APP ¶ 5, 426 P.3d at 638.
Id. ¶ 9.
Id. ¶ 10.
Id.
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Farquhar and Guzman in the 2002 deed. However, Goodson and McCrory
still own the remaining 1/2 interest in the property as joint tenants because
they never severed their interests.35 The appellate court reversed and
remanded the case, instructing the trial court to grant summary judgment to
Goodson in a manner consistent with its decision.
D. Tim Abraham v Palm Operating, LLC and Pacer Energy Marketing,
LLC, 2019 OK CIV APP 46, 447 P.3d 486.36
Palm Operating discussed which party is liable for paying production
from a well under the Production Revenue Standards Act – an operator or a
first purchaser of production.
In February of 2016, Tim Abraham alleged he owned a 1/32 carried
working interest in the Elias-Kerns No. 2 well. Palm Operating, LLC had
been the operator of the well since May of 2009, and Pacer Energy Marketing
had been the first purchaser of production from the well in January of 2010.37
Abraham claimed he demanded payment of proceeds from Palm and Pacer
but neither party paid him. Abraham alleged both defendants owed him
interest on the unpaid proceeds in violation of the Production Revenue
Standards Act (“PRSA”), actual and punitive damages for conversion, and
restitution.38
Pacer responded that it began purchasing crude oil from the well in
December of 2010 and denied Abraham’s allegation. Pacer alleged any
failure to make payment was because of Abraham’s negligence or Palm’s
(operator) error.39 In January of 2018, the trial court granted summary
judgment in favor of Abraham, and Pacer appealed.
The parties agreed that Palm directed Pacer to pay Palm the working
interest proceeds for the production Pacer took from the well. Abraham
claimed Pacer owed him interest based title 52, section §570.10(E)(1):
“Except as provided in paragraph 2 of this subsection, a first
purchaser who fails to remit proceeds from the sale of oil or gas
production to owners legally entitled thereto within the time
limitation set forth in paragraph 1 of subsection B of this section
shall be liable to such owners for interest as provided in subsection
D of this section on that portion of the proceeds not timely paid.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Id. ¶ 13.
Tim Abraham v. Palm Operating, LLC, 2019 OK CIV APP 46, 447 P.3d 486.
Id. ¶ 2.
Id.
Id. ¶ 3.
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When two or more persons fail to remit within such time
limitations, liability for such interest shall be shared by those
persons holding the proceeds in proportion to the time each person
held such proceeds.”40
Pacer responded it had no liability for the proceeds after it paid them to
Palm, the operator, pursuant to 52 O.S. 2011 §570.10(C)(1):
“A first purchaser that pays or causes to be paid proceeds from
production to the producing owner of such production or, at the
direction of the producing owners, pays or causes to be paid
royalty proceeds from production to the royalty interest owners
legally entitled thereto, or the operator of the well, shall not
thereafter be liable for such proceeds so paid and shall have
thereby discharged its duty to pay those proceeds on such
production.”41
Abraham argued section 570.10(C)(1) did not apply because Palm was not
the producing owner of the production attributable to Abraham’s interest –
Abraham owned that production himself. However, the appellate court noted
if a first purchaser is required to directly pay each working interest owner,
then parts of the PRSA would be superfluous.42
For example, section 570.4 provides an operator acts in a purely
ministerial capacity when it receives and disburses proceeds from producing
owners; section 570.5 details how working interest owners may designate a
party other than the operator to perform royalty accounting and remittance
functions; and section 570.10(C)(1) defines producing owner as “an owner
entitled to produce who during a given month produces oil or gas for its own
account or the account of subsequently created interests as they burden his
interest.” Abraham’s carried working interest specifically provided he would
have no control over the leased premises or the operations.43
Since Pacer paid its proceeds of production to Palm, the operator, the
appellate court ruled Pacer had discharged its liability under section
570.10(C)(1), and Abraham had no claim against Pacer. Therefore, the
appellate court reversed the trial court’s judgment in favor of Abraham.

40.
41.
42.
43.

Id. ¶ 7 (quoting OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 570.10(E)(1) (2019)).
Id.
Id. ¶ 8.
Id.
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E. Estate of Stolba, 2019 OK CIV APP 43, 446 P.3d 528.44
The Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals examined a will to determine what
happens when a court is unable to figure out the testator’s intent.
Margaret J. Stolba’s Will was admitted to probate in December of 2012
and it included the following provision:45
“The home stead will remain in trust, Not to be sold or split. All
four of you have got to get along. Work it out, you should be able
to have fun doing things there. Everyone should behave
themselves.”
The will also appointed co-personal representatives and gave them the
power to sell any part of the estate without court approval, an apparent
contradiction to the excerpt above preventing the homestead from being
“sold or split.”
Probate was still open in January of 2017, and Mark S. Stolba, one of the
decedent’s sons, filed an application to distribute the homestead to the
decedent’s four children equally, in accordance with intestate rules of
succession. Mark alleged either the trust failed for lack of required elements,
or the homestead provision quoted above created an unenforceable restriction
on alienation.46
In October of 2017, the district court distributed the homestead per the
rules of intestacy. The estate’s personal representative, Daniel Lowther, filed
a motion for a new trial. The court denied that motion and Lowther appealed.
The appellate court explained the main question is whether the “trust”
provision represents an “unenforceable perpetual ban on the alienation of real
property.”47 After dispensing with Lowther’s jurisdictional arguments, the
court explained how the homestead provision apparently violated the first
part of title 60, section 175.47 (Suspension of absolute power of alienation –
period of suspension):
“A. Except as otherwise provided in subsection B of this section,
the absolute power of alienation of real and personal property, or
either of them, shall not be suspended by any limitations or
conditions whatever for a longer period than during the

44.
45.
46.
47.

Estate of Stolba, 2019 OK CIV APP 43, 446 P.3d 528.
Id. ¶ 2.
Id.
Id. ¶ 6.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol5/iss2/19

2019]

Oklahoma

225

continuance of a life or lives of the beneficiaries in being at the
creation of the estate and twenty-one (21) years thereafter.”48
The court ruled not allowing the homestead to be sold or split violated
section 175.47 because it had no time limitation.49 However, Lowther argued
the second part of section 175.47 should apply: “The absolute power of
alienation is not suspended if there is any person in being who, alone or in
combination with one or more others, has the power to sell, exchange, or
otherwise convey the real or personal property.”50
Lowther argued even though the homestead is not to be sold, the will also
gave the personal representatives the power to sell any part of the estate. In
response, the court ruled the will’s specific restraint on alienation would
control over the personal representatives’ general power of sale.51
Next, Lowther argued the court should rewrite the homestead clause of the
will so it complies with section 175.47 pursuant to section 75 (“Reformation
of interests violating rule against perpetuities”)52 and section 77
(“Reformation of offending instruments”).53 However, the court declined to
rewrite the will, holding this case involved a restraint on alienation, not a
perpetuity.54
“Restraints upon alienation where there are no provisions for forfeiture or
reversion are ‘disabling restraints’ and void.”55 Sections 75 and 77 apply
when an interest may vest too late, but they do not apply to restraints on
alienation.56 A court cannot just shorten the vesting period to affect the
testator’s wishes; if the testator intends an absolute restriction on alienation,
no one can reform that restriction and maintain the testator’s intent.
In establishing its role in analyzing a will, the court cited In re Prather’s
Estate: “The rule of construction that the intent of the testator must be carried
out if possible does not authorize courts to make a new will to conform to
what they may think the testator intended. The intent of the testator must be
ascertained from the will as it stands.”57

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id. ¶ 13 (quoting OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 60, § 175.47 (2019)).
Id. ¶ 14.
Id.
Id. ¶ 16.
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 60, § 75 (2019).
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 60, § 77 (2019).
Estate of Stolba, 2019 OK CIV APP ¶¶ 17-18, 446 P.3d at 532.
Id. ¶ 19 (quoting Shields v. Moffit, 1984 OK 42, ¶26, 683 P.2d 530, 534.)
Id. ¶ 20.
Id. ¶ 22 (citing 1974 OK CIV APP 24, 527 P.2d 211, 215 n.4).
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The court pointed out even if the testator intended his homestead to be sold
after a certain time period, she does not specify how that property would be
distributed at that time, and the will did not include a residual beneficiary.
The court held even if the restraint on alienation could be reformed, no court
could rewrite the will without guessing at the testator’s intent.58 Therefore,
the court affirmed the district court and distributed the homestead property
per the rules of intestacy.
II. Federal Cases
A. Rhea v Apache Corporation, No. CIV-14-0433-JH, 2019 WL 1548909
(E.D. Okla. Feb. 2, 2019).59
The Eastern District of Oklahoma certified a class action in a case
concerning underpayment of royalties and whether or not royalty owner
should be paid for natural gas liquids.
Bigie Lee Rhea filed a class action on behalf of himself and other royalty
owners with interests in Oklahoma wells operated by Apache Corporation.
Rhea alleged Apache underpaid royalties by failing to obtain the best price
available for the gas it sold and produced.60 Specifically, Rhea claims:
[Apache] breached its implied duty to market gas and obtain the
best price available by (1) marketing the gas under a ‘keep whole’
contract which did not capture the value of the natural gas liquids
(‘NGLs’) included in the production, and (2) paying excessive
fees to the midstream processor even after the keep whole contract
was modified to capture the value of the NGL’s [sic].61
Additionally, Rhea alleged Apache failed to pay royalty on fuel gas used to
perform midstream services, despite contrary language in most of the
affected leases.62 Rhea made claims for breach of contract, tortious breach of
contract, fraud (actual and constructive), deceit, and for an accounting.63
On January 1, 1998, Apache entered into two contracts for gas sales from
Oklahoma wells (the “1998 Contracts”).64 A Gathering and Compression
Agreement covered gas wells connected to various pipeline systems owned
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Id. ¶ 23.
Rhea v. Apache Corp., 2019 WL 1548909 (E.D. Okla. Feb. 15, 2019).
Id. at *1.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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or operated by Transok, Inc.65 A Dedicated Interruptible Service Agreement
covered gas wells connected to two more pipeline systems owned by
Transok.66 The 1998 Contracts, which were due to expire at the end of 2012:
[D]edicated all future wells drilled or recompleted within five
miles of one of the pipeline systems to the relevant agreement,
required Transok to deliver “thermally equivalent” volumes of gas
for the account of defendant after NGLs and other substances
were removed during processing. . . and reserved the right to
defendant to “process all of its gas and retain all of the oil and
liquid hydrocarbons.”67
The 1998 Contracts are described as “keep-whole” contracts where an
operator allows the midstream company to process the gas to remove the
NGLs and keep those liquids for its own use or sale.68 The midstream
company keeps the operator “whole” by delivering a “thermally equivalent”
amount of residue gas to the operator after processing. Apache paid royalties
based on the residue gas.69
Rhea alleged that under this type of contract, a royalty owner is not paid
on the best price available for the gas sold by its operator.70 The value of the
NGLs removed exceeds the value of the residue gas returned to the operator.
The difference between these values is called the “NGL uplift.”71 Therefore,
Rhea claimed Apache paid royalties based on a lower price than if the NGLs
had not been removed from the gas – Rhea did not receive value for the
NGLs.72 Apache argued “the contracts were reasonable based on the
circumstances existing at the time.”73
On July 1, 2011, Apache entered into a Gas Gathering and Processing
Agreement (the “2011 Contract”) with Enogex Gathering and Processing.74
Under this contract, Apache received value for the NGLs and paid royalties
based on that value, distinguishing this contract from the 1998 Contracts.75

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *2.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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However, Rhea alleged the 2011 Contract included unreasonable fees which
“improperly diminished the amount of royalties paid to the class.”76
Rhea presented a lease chart (5,679 total leases) to the court and claimed,
“none of the leases negate the duty to pay the best price available for the
gas.”77 Also, Rhea argued 4,159 leases include express language that royalty
will be paid on all constituents of gas produced, 538 leases expressly allow
for the deduction of various post-production costs, and 4,824 of the leases
mandate Apache pay royalty on “fuel gas,” gas used to power gathering,
compressing, and processing equipment off the lease premises.78 Rhea claims
Apache never paid royalties on the fuel gas.79
Rhea represented a class of:
All non-excluded persons or entities with royalty interests in wells
with a Btu content of 1050 or higher where Apache Corporation
marketed gas from the well pursuant to the terms of the January
1, 1998 contracts between Transok, Inc. and Apache Corporation
and/or the July 1, 2011 contract between Enogex Gathering &
Processing LLC and Apache Corporation on or after January 1,
2000.80
This class was meant to include only those parties whose gas contained NGLs
at the time it was produced.81
To determine whether or not to certify the proposed class, the court set out
the requirements to certify a class action under Rule 23 of the federal rules
of civil procedure: numerosity, commonality, typicality and adequacy, and
predominance and superiority.82
Numerosity – The plaintiff must show the “class is so numerous that
joinder of all members is impracticable.”83 Given the number of wells, the
court noted the class could include more than 5,000 persons, easily satisfying
the numerosity requirement.84

76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
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Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *3.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Commonality – Rhea needs to show there are “questions of law or fact
common to the class.” Determining this common question must “resolve an
issue that is central to the validity of each one of the claims in one stroke.”85
Rhea argued common questions included:
(1) whether defendant owed a uniform duty to pay royalties on
the best price available for the gas; (2) whether defendant used a
uniform royalty payment methodology; (3) whether defendant’s
royalty payment methodology breached the duty to pay royalties
on the best price available; (4) whether subclass leases contained
an express lease clause that required the payment of royalty on
fuel gas; (5) whether defendant breached the fuel gas clause; and
(6) whether an elevated fee initially charged under the 2011
contract breached duties to the class.86
In response, Apache argued the commonality question in this type of case
was answered in Foster v. Apache Corp.87 In Foster, the plaintiff attempted
to certify a class of more than 10,000 royalty owners in more than 1,200
wells.88 However, that case involved gas sales under 30 different marketing
arrangements with numerous purchasers.89 The Foster court ruled the
plaintiff failed to establish commonality because of variations in lease
languages.90
The court distinguished this case from Foster because here Rhea claimed
the leases had something in common: none of the leases included language
negating Apache’s duty to obtain the best price available for the gas.91 The
court determined this pointed towards a collective resolution. “[W]hether
defendant had a uniform duty to pay royalties on the best price available,
used a uniform royalty payment method to pay those royalties, and, in doing
so, breached the duty to pay royalties on the best price available are all
questions common to the proposed class.”92
The court dismissed Apache’s other arguments against commonality
regarding fuel gas provisions in the leases and whether or not the processing

85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Id.
Id.
285 F.R.D. 632 (W.D. Okla. 2012).
Rhea, 2019 WL 1548909 at *3.
Id.
Id. at *4.
Id.
Id.
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fee in the 2011 Contract was excessive.93 However, the court did note part of
the proceedings may not be appropriate for class-wide resolution: Apache’s
evidence that not all gas produced from the wells was processed to extract
NGLs.94 Therefore, the court found Rhea’s proposed class of “persons with
royalty interests in wells with a Btu content of 1050 or higher” as overly
broad because it could include “rich gas” wells where NGLs were not
removed. If NGLs were not removed, Rhea’s claim for lost royalty would
fail.95
However, the court ruled this meant only that it would modify the class
instead of decertifying it altogether.96 The court decided the class should be
“only those wells whose gas was actually processed.”97
Typicality and Adequacy – Apache argued Rhea’s claims were not
typical of the rest of the class. Apache noted Rhea’s lease is a “market value
at the wellhead lease” which has been “held to require royalties to be paid on
the condition of the gas at the wellhead before processing.”98 However, the
court pointed out this did not negate Rhea’s argument “that the value of the
gas at the wellhead would include the value of the NGLs contained therein.”99
Also, Apache argued Rhea was paid differently than other class members
because his lease prevented deductions for post-production costs.100 But
Apache acknowledged that prior to 2012, it did not distinguish between
royalty owners whose leases allowed for such deductions and those that did
not.101 As a result, such costs were deducted from all class members, meaning
Rhea was treated the same as the rest of the class despite any differences in
lease language.102
Predominance and Superiority – Apache argued individual questions
predominate the class because of the varying obligations and contracts
typically involved in royalty underpayment cases.103 In response, Rhea
claimed this is not a typical royalty underpayment case. Rhea did not argue
when the gas became marketable or whether or not the processing costs were
reasonable; Rhea only requested “royalties to be paid on the value of the
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
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residue gas plus the value of the NGLs removed during the processing[.]”104
This would be Rhea’s best price available for the gas. He argued Mittelstaedt
v. Santa Fe Minerals, Inc. would not apply to this case.105
However, the court noted that under the 1998 Contracts, “the value of the
NGLs appears to have been transferred to the midstream processor as at least
a partial fee for processing.”106 According to the court, Mittelstaedt would
therefore apply to this case and “operators may charge post-production costs
to the lessor if (1) once the gas is in a marketable condition; (2) the postproduction costs enhanced the value of the gas; (3) the costs are reasonable;
and (4) the costs increased royalties proportionally.”107 Usually, it is not
possible to determine when gas becomes marketable on a class-wide basis,
thus defeating class certification. However, this issue is not present because
Rhea did not contest whether the gas was marketable at the wellhead.
Rhea does not challenge the fees charged by the midstream processor;
Rhea only argued Apache should pay royalties on the NGL uplift.108 The
court ruled the NGL fee is the only fee at issue, and it is charged against all
class members uniformly.109 Therefore, the questions are “whether
evaluation of the value of the NGLs as fees enhanced the value of the residue
gas, whether that was a reasonable fee, and whether royalties increased in
proportion to that value[.]”110 The court determined these common questions
predominated over any individual questions.111
Since Rhea met the four requirements for class certification, the court
granted Rhea’s motion for class certification as modified.
B. Naylor Farms, Inc. v Chaparral Energy, LLC, 923 F.3d 779 (10th Cir.
2019).112
Naylor is another federal case concerning a potential class action
involving deduction of gas treatment costs. The Western District of
Oklahoma granted plaintiff’s motion to certify, and the Tenth Circuit
affirmed.

104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

Id.
Id. (relying on Mittelstaedt v. Santa Fe Minerals, 1998 OK 7, 954 P.2d 1203).
Id.
Id. (quoting Mittelstaedt, 1998 OK ¶¶ 23-30, 954 P.2d at 1209).
Id.
Id. at *8.
Id.
Id.
Naylor Farms, Inc. v. Chaparral Energy, LLC, 923 F.3d 779 (10th Cir. 2019).
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Under Oklahoma law, Chaparral Energy, LLC and other lessees have an
implied duty of marketability (“IDM”), or “a duty to provide a marketable
production available to market.”113 Raw or unprocessed gas typically must
undergo field processes such as gathering compressing, dehydrating,
transporting, and producing (GCDTP services) to make it marketable.114
Therefore, in Oklahoma, lessees usually bear the costs for those services.115
Invoking this duty, Naylor Farms, Inc. sued Chaparral and asserted claims
for breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, unjust enrichment, and
failure to produce in paying quantities.116 Naylor claimed Chaparral
improperly deducted GCDTP service costs from royalties paid to Naylor and
other royalty owners.117 Specifically, Naylor alleged Chaparral agreed to
wellhead sales contracts with midstream processing companies wherein the
midstream processor would acquire title/possession of the gas at or near the
wellhead, but it would not pay Chaparral for the gas until after it had
completed the GCDTP services.118
Once those services were completed, Naylor claimed “the midstream
companies (1) take the gross proceeds they receive from the downstream
sales; (2) deduct from those gross proceeds the costs and fees associated with
performing the GCDTP services; and (3) pay Chaparral for the gas they
previously acquired at the wellhead by giving Chaparral the resulting net
proceeds.”119 Then Chaparral paid royalties based on the net proceeds
received from the midstream processor, instead of paying royalties based on
the gross proceeds the processor received from the downstream sales.120
Naylor alleged that as a result, Chaparral forced the royalty owners to pay
their share of the costs to transform the gas into a marketable product.121
Naylor argued class certification for it and other similarly situated royalty
owners was appropriate “because (1) whether Chaparral breached the IDM
is a common question, and (2) this and other common questions predominate
over any individual ones.”122

113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Id. at 783.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Chaparral responded that an alleged breach of the IDM is not a common
question because an answer would require reviewing the language in each
separate lease and the gas produced from each separate well.123 Also,
Chaparral argued these specialized questions predominate over any common
questions, and therefore, Naylor can not satisfy the requirements for class
certification.124 The district court disagreed with Chaparral and granted
Naylor’s motion to certify, ruling Naylor “identified at least one common
question: whether Chaparral breached the IDM.”125
On appeal, Chaparral made three arguments: (1) marketability is an
individual question which necessarily predominates over any common
questions; (2) distinctions in lease language give rise to individual questions
which predominate over common ones; and (3) in the absence of evidence
that Chaparral uses a uniform payment methodology, certification is
inappropriate.126
1. Marketability
Naylor argued Chaparral breached the IDM by charging royalty owners
their share of the costs for the GCDTP services. The court notes both parties
agree the issue is when the gas becomes marketable. However, the parties
disagree whether they need an individual analysis of each well to answer this
issue.127
To decide whether class certification is appropriate, the court gave an
overview of Oklahoma state law concerning when gas becomes
marketable.128 The court cited Mittelstaedt for gas marketability, but noted
this case differs in that it deals with wellhead sales contracts.129 Therefore, in
the absence of Oklahoma Supreme Court (“OSC”) authority on the specific
issue at hand, the court indicated it must predict how the OSC would rule.130
Of course, the court looked to Mittelstaedt to answer that question.131
In Mittelstaedt, the OSC explained the IDM forces lessees to provide a
marketable product, and raw or unprocessed gas must usually undergo

123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
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Id.
Id.
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Id.
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GCDTP services to make it marketable.132 Therefore, the OSC ruled if those
services are necessary to make the gas marketable, then the lessee must bear
the costs of those services. However, if the gas is in a marketable condition
at the wellhead, and the lessee has those GCDTP services performed to
increase the value of the gas, then the lessee may charge those costs to the
royalty owner under certain circumstances.133
Now the court did note that Mittelstaedt did not define the term
“marketable,” and it did not identify the factors which determine when and
where gas becomes marketable.134 The court also pointed out the OSC has
declined to answer those questions in a couple 2018 cases: Whisenant v Strat
Land Expl. Co. and Pummill v. Hancock. However, the Oklahoma Court of
Civil Appeals (“OCOCA”) reached decisions in both cases.
In Whisenant, the OCOCA held the “answer to the marketability question
will always turn, at least in part, on the quality of the gas at issue.”135 This
means an individualized, fact-intensive review would be necessary to
determine if a lessee breached the IDM.
However, in Pummill, the OCOCA ruled it may be possible to determine
gas marketability without such a review.136 In that case, the gas was not
marketable at the wellhead and it was not sold until it was transferred into a
pipeline. Therefore, the operator was “not in the wellhead market,” but rather
in the high-pressure pipeline market.137 In that case, the OCOCA focused on
when the gas was first capable of being sold into the market in which the
operator chose to participate138 – “gas becomes marketable when it’s subject
to an actual sale.”139 In Naylor, the plaintiffs argued Chaparral sold its gas at
the pipeline, not at the wellhead, and therefore the gas had to undergo at least
one GCDTP service to become marketable, or sold into the pipeline, making
Chaparral more like the lessee in Pummill.140
It may appear that the OCOCA issued two opposite rulings in these cases.
In Whisenant, the court held an individualized review may be necessary to
determine if a lessee breached an IDM,141 while in Pummill, the court held
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

Mittelstaedt, 1998 OK ¶¶ 20-21, 954 P.2d at 1208.
Naylor Farms, 923 F.3d at 785-86.
Id. at 786.
Whisenant v. Strat Land Expl. Co., 2018 OK CIV APP 65, 429 P.3d 703.
Pummill v. Hancock Expl. LLC, 2018 OK CIV APP 48, 419 P.3d 1268.
Id. ¶ 36, 419 P.3d at 1278.
Id. ¶ 44, 419 P.3d at 1279.
Naylor Farms, 923 F.3d at 788.
Id.
Whisenant, 2018 OK CIV APP 65, 429 P.3d 703.
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such a review would be unnecessary.142 However, the 10th Circuit pointed
out the Whisenant court left open the possibility that a fact-intensive review
may not be necessary in all cases, and the Pummill case fit in that open
space.143
After reviewing these Oklahoma court decisions, the court turned to
analyzing Rule 23’s certification requirements, and decided only two of those
are at issue: commonality and predominance.144 The district court ruled
whether Chaparral breached the IDM was a common question which
predominated over any other questions.145 To do so, it narrowed the class to
“only those royalty owners whose leases contain clauses that are similar to
the royalty clauses (collectively, Mittelstaedt Clauses) the OSC considered
in three cases: (1) Mittelstaedt, (2) TXO Production Corp, v State ex rel.
Commissioners of Land Office…and (3) Wood v TXO Production
Corp.[.]”146 Since the OSC held these clauses do not negate the IDM, the
district court ruled “any remaining variations in lease language do not defeat
commonality or predominance.”147
Regarding Chaparral’s argument that the court must determine when the
gas from each well became marketable, the district court ruled that would be
unnecessary because all of the gas in question required at least one GCDTP
service to become marketable.148 The class does not include gas which was
already marketable at the wellhead. Therefore, the court ruled marketability
in this case is subject to class-wide proof because variations in the quality of
the gas are irrelevant to the predominant question.149
2. Lease Language
Next, Chaparral argued the language in each lease would have to be
analyzed separately, thus defeating commonality and predominance. The
district court disagreed, holding this type of analysis would be unnecessary
because it limited the class to leases with Mittelstaedt clauses.150

142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

Pummill, 2018 OK CIV APP 48, 419 P.3d 1268.
Naylor Farms, 923 F.3d at 788.
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Id. at 784.
Id. at 790.
Id. (internal quotation omitted).
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Id. at 794.
Id. at 795.
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Chaparral argued the district court merely relied on Naylor’s claims that
the leases in questions contain Mittelstaedt clauses.151 The Tenth Circuit
disagreed, noting Naylor prepared a lease chart categorizing the different
language in each lease because that was what it was supposed to do.152 Also,
the district court independently verified the chart was “generally accurate.”
Additionally, Chaparral did not provide evidence that Naylor’s lease chart
was inaccurate.153
Chaparral also argued the leases included different royalty provisions and
the leases were ambiguous; this ambiguity would allow the introduction of
extrinsic evidence. However, the court pointed out Chaparral waived its
extrinsic evidence argument because it did not preserve it on appeal and
failed to adequately brief it anyway.154
3. Uniform Payment Methodology
Finally, Chaparral argued Naylor did not demonstrate Chaparral used a
uniform payment methodology to calculate royalty payments and “this lack
of a common payment methodology defeats class certification.”155 The court
noted that while existence of such a methodology is not enough to establish
predominance by itself, its existence is also not necessary to establish
predominance.156
Ultimately, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision to
certify the class action and held Chaparral failed to show how the lower
court’s decision fell outside the bounds of “rationally available choices.”157
C. Davilla v Enable Midstream Partners L.P., 913 F.3d 959 (10th Cir.
2019).
Davilla dealt with the ramifications of the expiration of a pipeline
easement on Native American lands, and whether a landowner must first
demand removal of the pipeline before it can prove a trespass.158
Enable owned and operated a natural gas pipeline which crossed Native
American allotted lands in Anadarko, Oklahoma.159 The pipeline was built
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

Id.
Id. at 795-96.
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Id. at 796-97.
Id. at 798.
Id.
Id.
Davilla v Enable Midstream Partners L.P., 913 F.3d 959 (10th Cir. 2019)
Id. at 962.
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pursuant to a 20 year term easement which expired in 2000.160 Enable never
renewed the easement and they never removed the pipeline. Therefore, some
Native American Allottees sued Enable for trespass, arguing Enable had no
right to be on the land once the term expired.161 The Western District of
Oklahoma granted summary judgment to the Allottees, ruling Enable
trespassed on the land.162 The district court also issued a permanent
injunction and ordered Enable to remove the pipeline.163 The Tenth Circuit
affirmed the summary judgment, reversed the permanent injunction, and
remanded for further proceedings.164
The Court described the various federal laws enacted in the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries aimed at Native American assimilation.165
Congress divided Native American reservations into allotments and assigned
parcels of land to individual Native Americans.166 However, many Native
Americans lost their lands through dubious or fraudulent transactions, so
Congress passed the Indian Reorganization Act in 1934.167 This Act ended
the allotment period in favor of the federal government holding the allotted
lands in trust for the benefit of the individual Native Americans
indefinitely.168 This did not affect lands the government had already patented,
so while some Native Americans owned their lands in fee, other adjacent
Native American landowners may have only “owned” their lands subject to
a trust in favor of the government.169 The land at issue in this case was allotted
in 1901 to a Kiowa woman named Emaugobah, but because she never
received a patent for the land, the government held it in trust.170
While the population moved west across the Great Plains, Congress passed
several right-of-way statutes.171 They empowered the Secretary of the
Interior to approve easements across all lands held in trust for individual
Native Americans or Native American tribes.172 However, if an allotment
was shared between multiple Native Americans, the Secretary needed
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
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166.
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consent of a “majority of the [equitable] interests” to grant the right-ofway.173
So, in 1980, the Secretary approved a 25 foot wide pipeline easement
across a portion of Emaugobah’s allotment for a 20 year term.174 Same
expired in 2000 and Enable, who acquired the easement from the original
owner, tried to secure a new 20 year easement from the Allottees and the
Bureau of Indian Affairs.175 However, Enable never gained approval from a
majority of the allottees and the Bureau canceled their application for the new
easement.176 Since Enable continued to operate the pipeline, some of the
Allottees sued claiming Enable was trespassing on their land and demanded
the pipeline be removed.177
On appeal, Enable argued the district court erred in granting summary
judgment on the trespass claims and in issuing a permanent injunction to
enforce the ruling.178
1. Summary Judgment
a) Consent as a Defense to Trespass
The Tenth Circuit noted it reviews a summary judgment ruling by asking
if there is a genuine issue of material fact, and all evidence is construed in
favor of the movant.179 However, the court pointed out federal law
complicates this issue.180 Federal law must govern when Native American
allotted lands are at issue, but Congress has not created a federal right of
action for trespass.181 Therefore, the court must look at “federal common
law.” However, the court “lack[ed] a federal body of trespass law to protect
the Allottees’ federal property interests, [it] must borrow state law to the
extent it comports with federal policy.”182
In Oklahoma, a trespass occurs when one person physically invades
someone else’s property without the permission of the person in lawful
possession of that property.183 This led the court to consider three elements
173.
174.
175.
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178.
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180.
181.
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183.
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related to a trespass: (1) the Allottees must be entitled to possession of the
allotment; (2) they must show “Enable physically entered or remained on the
allotment;” and (3) the Allottees must show Enable had no legal right to
remain on the allotment.184
Enable argued it had consent sufficient to show it could maintain the
pipeline even after the 20-year term expired.185 In Nahno-Lopez, the court
held “consent forms a complete defense to trespass” under Oklahoma law.186
In 2004, Enable obtained written consent forms from five of the thirty-seven
allottees allowing the company to maintain the pipeline.187 Despite not
obtaining consent from anywhere near 50% of the allottees, Enable argued
this effort at least created a material fact sufficient to defeat a summary
judgment motion.188
After pointing out Enable had confused the law on trespass, the court noted
federal law dictates the prerequisites to obtain a right-of-way: Enable must
secure the right-of-way from the Secretary of the Interior, who must have the
allottees’ approval.189 Until that process is completed, Enable has no right to
enter the land or continue operating the pipeline.190 In other words, even if
Enable obtained consent forms from every allottee, it still needed the
Secretary to approve the easement.191
Turning to common law, Enable attempted to equate the several allottees
with tenants in common, arguing a single owner may enter into a lease
without the co-owner’s consent.192 The court held these allottees are not
traditional tenants in common and Enable did not provide any persuasive
authority anyway.193
The court held the undisputed facts (expiration of the easement) showed
Enable had no right to be on the land. Obtaining a few consent forms did not
change this fact, so the court affirmed the summary judgment motion.194
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Id. at 966.
Id.
Nahno-Lopez v. Houser, 625 F.3d 1279 (10th Cir. 2010).
Davilla, 913 F.3d at 966.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 967.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2019

240

Oil and Gas, Natural Resources, and Energy Journal

[Vol. 5

b) Demand for Removal
Enable argued it had no duty to remove the pipeline because the Allottees
never demanded the pipeline be removed.195 In response, the court noted
Enable did not raise this argument at the district court level.196 Enable argued
the Allottees never included the demand for removal in their briefs, so Enable
did not respond to same.197 However, the 10th Circuit held even an
“incomplete view of the law” may support a summary judgment motion, and
it is not up to the court to fill in the blanks for the movant if it is not necessary
to the ruling.198
However, the court noted Oklahoma case law has not established a
demand requirement, instead turning to the Restatement (Second) of Torts to
show “the lapse of any specified period of time by which the consent is
restricted” would terminate consent.199 “According to these rules, the
easement’s expiration created a duty to remove the pipeline.”200
2. Permanent Injunction
Regarding the district court’s awarding of a permanent injunction, Enable
argued the lower court “incorporated a simplified injunction rule from
Oklahoma law when it should have adhered to basic tenants of federal equity
jurisprudence.”201 The Tenth Circuit agreed and reversed the injunction
order.202
The lower court applied Oklahoma law to determine “equity will restrain
a continuing trespass,” but it should have applied the usual four-factor test
federal courts use to grant permanent injunctive relief.203 Whether a federal
court should apply state law to a matter is rarely a black and white issue, but
the Tenth Circuit held this case presented “a distinct need for nationwide
legal standards.”204 The federal right-of-way statute applies to all lands held
in trust by the United States, and “the nationwide application of this right-ofway statute suggests a need for a uniform federal standard.”205
195.
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Since the Secretary of the Interior has power over lands in multiple states,
the court ruled it would be helpful to treat easement holders in Oklahoma the
same as easement holders in Kansas.206 Therefore, the district court should
have applied the federal permanent-injunction standard. The lower court
should consider “(1) whether an injunction is necessary to prevent irreparable
harm, (2) whether the threatened injury outweighs the harm that the
injunction may cause to the enjoined party, and (3) whether the injunction
would adversely affect the public interest.”207 Therefore, the court reversed
the permanent injunction and remanded so the lower court could apply the
federal standard instead of the state test.208
III. State Regulatory Developments
A. Oklahoma Corporation Commission Regulatory Updates
On May 28, 2019, the Governor approved revised permanent rules
promulgated by the Oklahoma Corporation Commission (the
“Commission”),209 which became effective on August 1, 2019, and made
numerous revisions and updates to Commission rules affecting oil and gas
development. Notable changes include the following:
(a)

206.
207.
208.
209.

Okla. Admin. Code Section 165:10-3-5, which pertains to drilling,
completion, recompletion, and remedial operations on wells
located within the boundaries of underground storage facilities,
was amended to require that well operators provide notice of an
application for a Permit to Drill a well to the storage operators and
the Director of the Public Utility Division as part of the
application for Permit to Drill process if (i) the proposed well falls
within one mile of the certified boundary of an underground
storage facility or (ii) the completion intervals for the proposed
well will, at any point, be located within 600 feet of an
underground storage facility. Under the revised rule, notices
required prior to logging, plugging and casing operations must
now be provided at least 48 hours in advance. The revised rule
also requires cement plugs for noncommercial wells to cover not
less than 300 feet (previously 100 feet) below the base to not less

Id.
Id. at 973.
Id.
See 36 OKLA. REG. 1675–1744 (July 15, 2019) for a comprehensive list of the rules.
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than 300 feet (previously 100 feet) above the top of the
underground storage facility.210
(b)

Okla. Admin. Code Section 165:10-3-10, which pertains to well
completion operations, was revised to require operators to notify
the operator of a producing spacing unit or well within one mile
(previously one-half mile) of the perforated interval of the
proposed well within five days of obtaining Conservation
Division authorization to use diesel fuel as the base fluid for
hydraulic fracturing operations. Prior to the 2019 revisions,
operators were also required to provide five business days notice
prior to the commencement of hydraulic fracturing operations on
a horizontal well to operators of producing wells located within
one-half mile of the completion interval of the subject well that
were completed in the same common source of supply as the
horizontal well. Under the revised rule, operators must notify
operators of producing wells located within one mile of the
completion interval of the subject well, regardless of whether such
wells were completed in the same common source of supply as
the horizontal well.211

(c)

Okla. Admin Code Section 165:10-3-15, which pertains to the
venting and flaring of gas, was revised to include a new
requirement that operators notify the appropriate Conservation
Division District Office or Field Inspector within 24 hours of
initiating the flaring of gas with an H2S content exceeding 100
ppm. The revised rule also (i) extends the temporary permit
exemption period for gas vented or flared in excess of 50 mcf/day
during initial flowback from a newly completed or recompleted
well from 14 days to 21 days, and (ii) extends the temporary
permit exemption period for gas vented or flared in excess of 50
mcf/day after initial flowback from a newly completed or
recompleted well from 30 days to 45 days.212

(d)

Okla. Admin. Code Section 165:10-3-16, which pertains to oil and
gas operations in hydrogen sulfide areas, was revised to expand
the scope of operations subject to the rule. The revised rule lowers
existing ppm thresholds to increase the rule’s applicability, and

210. OKLA. ADMIN. CODE § 165:10-3-5 (2019).
211. OKLA. ADMIN. CODE § 165:10-3-10 (2019).
212. OKLA. ADMIN. CODE § 165:10-3-15 (2019).
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new ppm thresholds are added. Safety measures applicable to
townsites and cities are now applicable to rural residential
subdivisions. Under the revised rule, the Commission may now
impose fines of up to $5,000 for violations.213

213. OKLA. ADMIN. CODE § 165:10-3-16 (2019).
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